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Abstract
This paper looks for evidence that the availability of external ﬁnance af-
fects the aggregate investment of non-ﬁnancial corporations of the US. We
do not ﬁnd any empirical support for this hypothesis. Furthermore, we ﬁnd
that the amount of external ﬁnance raised does not depend on the need to ﬁ-
nance investment. Share issuance seems to be largely driven by stock market
prices; moreover, quite surprisingly, it generates a positive impact on both
the Tobin’s Q and debt issuance.
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11 Introduction
Hayashi (1982) has shown that in presence of constant returns to scale and
competitive markets, the marginal productivity of investment is equal to the aver-
age productivity, and it is measured by the ratio between the value of the liabilities
of the ﬁrm and the replacement cost of capital, i.e. the Tobin’s q. The Neoclassi-
cal theory of investment and the Tobin’s q, nevertheless, differ in many important
respects. The Tobin’s q theory implies a causal relationship: higher stock market
prices drive investment. In the ﬁrst order condition of the neoclassical model, on
the contrary, the variables corresponding to the Tobin’s q are not exogenous: the
theory rather implies a bidirectional causality. Thus, it is possible that the corre-
lation between q and investment is largely driven by the latter. In this case stock
market prices do not inﬂuence investment but, being forward looking, provide an
ex ante valuation of the proﬁtability of both the existent stock of capital and the
investment opportunities available to the entrepreneur: the Tobin’s q becomes a
leading indicator of future investment, even if no direct casual relationship takes
place.
In this paper we study empirically the relevance of external ﬁnance for the
investment of industrial ﬁrms. We thus want to estimate if Tobin’s theory is sup-
ported empirically. Our point is that if ﬁnancial variables are relevant in order to
ﬁnance investment, than the sums raised by either primary placements of shares,
or debt issuance, or both, must somewhat inﬂuence the quantity of investment. In
other words, when a measure of the Tobin’s q is signiﬁcant in a regression on in-
vestment, for a causal relationship to take place, some other conditions must hold.
Firstly, the signiﬁcance of the Tobin’s q must be due to stock market valuations,
rather than to the current marginal productivity of capital. 1 Secondly, high stock
prices must cause the issuance of new stock and/or new debt. Finally, the amount
of ﬁnance raised by means of the issuance of new securities must inﬂuence in-
vestment. Blanchard et al. (1993), for instance, suggest that it is more rational for
ﬁrms issuing new shares opportunistically, in order to take advantage of high stock
prices, to invest the proceeds in bonds. In the absence of new investment opportu-
nities, in fact, the investment in capital incurs in decreasing marginal returns, while
the returns obtained by purchasing bonds are constant.
As suggested by Christopher A. Sims in his discussion of Morck et al. (1990),
we choose to study the relationship between ﬁnancial ﬂows and real investment
without taking any a priori stance on the causality relationships occurring among
the variables under analysis. Unlike many previous works on this ﬁeld, we con-
1The impact of the current value of the marginal productivity of capital on Tobin’s q is captured
by the denominator of the ratio, when the Hayashi (1982) assumptions hold.
2struct a simple theoretical model which permits the choice of the macroeconomic
variables at work on a theoretical ground. We thus estimate a reduced form equa-
tion using VAR techniques; the VAR has two major advantages: it allows consid-
ering all the variables as endogenous, and to analyze simultaneously stationary and
non-stationary variables. The only cost imposed by the VAR is the loss of the con-
temporaneous relationships among the variables, but we regard this problem as mi-
nor. Industrial investment projects need long periods to be completed, often lasting
several quarters if not years; stocks and bonds issuance, on the contrary, because
of large transaction costs, is normally concentrated in a very few emissions, if not
a single issue. It seems thus unlikely that contemporaneous relationships among
these variables play a major role. We use aggregate data for the US economy that
are available for a long time span, of more than ﬁfty years. The analysis covers
different business cycles, and this allows to capture the long-run dynamics of the
variables. Moreover, since the analysis makes extensive use of Granger causality
tests, which have low power, longer time-series enhance the statistical reliability
of these tests. The obvious cost is the loss of cross-ﬁrms heterogeneity. We thus
regard the empirical evidence provided by this study as complementary to that ob-
tained by means of ﬁrm-level data, and we show that our results are compatible
with these last.
We ﬁnd no evidence that the funds raised by means of primary placements im-
pact on investment. We rather ﬁnd that share issuance is largely driven by stock
market prices. Moreover, and quite surprisingly, share issuance, in aggregate, not
only does not cause a downward pressure on stock prices, but it rather generates a
positive impact on our measure of Tobin’s q. Furthermore, debt issuance increases
as the value of Tobin’s q rises, so that share and debt issuance are complements.
Ourhypothesisisthatthethreevariablesreacttothesameunderlyingdrivingforce,
the expected proﬁtability of ﬁrms. Issuance thus rises when the stock market has
an upward trend, as managers that beneﬁt from inside information try to anticipate
the peak in stock market valuations. This is in line with the theory developed by
P´ astor and Veronesi (2005) suggesting that ﬁrms do not go public uniformly over
time, but that rather IPOs tend to be concentrated in waves. Equally surprising,
we ﬁnd evidence that investment shocks have a negative impact on share issuance.
Our results complements those of the literature based on ﬁrm-level data. Lyandres
et al. (2007), in particular, highlight that ﬁrms issuing stocks tend to invest more
than the average, and suggest that the larger investment causes the poor returns
that the shares of these ﬁrms normally experience during the two years follow-
ing the issuance. Given the aggregate nature of our data, we do not ﬁnd evidence
that issuance affects investment, but this is not surprising in consideration of the
relevance of large ﬁrms for aggregate investment. Moreover, Fama and French
(1999) have shown that aggregate investment is largely ﬁnanced by means of re-
3tained earnings. Since we study the quantity of cash raised from external sources
by ﬁrms, we rather ﬁnd that investment has a negative impact on the amount of
cash raised from the stock market. We interpret this result as evidence that the
stock market rationally anticipates that the shares of those ﬁrms that need to ﬁ-
nance large investment projects tend to underperform the rest of the market.2 As a
consequence, ﬁrms that need to invest less in real capital (such as those of human
capital intensive sectors) experience higher than average price-earning ratios, and
the IPOs or seasoned equity offerings of these ﬁrms raise larger amounts of cash.
Finally, although our results are far from being conclusive, we ﬁnd some evidence
that the signiﬁcance of the Tobin’s q, when regressed on investment, is due to the
marginal productivity of capital.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the relevant literature,
Section 3 develops the basic theoretical model of investment that we use. Sec-
tion 4 describes the dataset, while Section 5 sets out the econometric methodology
employed. Section 6 describes our empirical results and Section 7 presents our
conclusions.
2 The literature
In order to empirically asses the role of stock markets in ﬁnancing investment,
Morck et al. (1990) compare the R2 of different regression models, providing ev-
idence that the relationship between relative stock returns and investment is not
driven by the cost of external ﬁnance. Fama and French (1999) depict a quite sim-
ilar picture: they show that internally generated funds cover about 69.5 per cent
of investment, while new issues of stocks play a limited role in their sample, ﬁ-
nancing only 7.9 per cent of the investment, the rest being ﬁnanced with debt.
Baker et al. (2003), on the contrary, ﬁnd that the sensitiveness of investment to
stock prices is correlated to an index measuring the degree by which ﬁrms are eq-
uity constrained. Nevertheless, the relationship between q and investment should
be particularly strong when shares are priced irrationally, generating unstable but
long-lasting equilibria with substantial overpricing.3 In this case managers and
shareholders could exploit this irrationality by issuing new equities to ﬁnance in-
vestment projects at a substantial discount. This hypothesis has been tested by
Chirinko and Schaller (1996) estimating a dynamic investment model; they found
2Shares of ﬁrms of industrial sectors that require heavy capital investment normally trade at much
lower multiples with respect to fundamentals than those of other sectors. Since the need to ﬁnance
investment is a drain on cash ﬂows, ﬁrms in these industries have lower than average dividend pay-
outs.
3For example, because of fundamental psychological factors, as argued by Shiller (2005). See
also Kurz (1997).
4that bubbles were present in the US stock market, but they had no inﬂuence on
investment, which was instead driven by fundamentals. More recently, Gilchrist
et al. (2005) came to an opposite conclusion employing the VAR methodology.
Blanchard et al. (1993) followed a different approach, regressing the difference of
the log values of investment to capital ratios on the Tobin’s q, and on different
measures of fundamentals. They conclude that “market valuation appears to play
a limited role, given fundamentals, in the determination of investment decisions.”4
Blanchard et al. (1993) provide an important explanation for the lack of response of
investment to abnormally high share prices: they argue that the rational response of
managers in this situation is to issue shares, but in order to purchase riskless bonds
rather than to ﬁnance real investment, since the marginal productivity of capital is
decreasing. Overall, though, the empirical evidence produced so far does not pro-
vide a strong, convincing support for the hypothesis that stock market valuations
are relevant for investment.
So, why do ﬁrms go public? The survey of the literature by Ritter and Welch
(2002) shows that market conditions are the most important factor inﬂuencing the
decision to go public, and that the stage of the ﬁrm in its life cycle may be relevant,
although to a much lesser extent. Analyzing the market of the US, Welch (2004)
concluded that stock returns is the only relevant variable in explaining the level of
issuance, while in most circumstances the fundamental “corporate issuing motives
remain largely a mystery.” 5 Another important piece of evidence is provided by
Pagano et al. (1998) who have analyzed the determinants of IPOs in the Italian
market. According to their analysis, “the likelihood of an IPO is increasing in the
company’s size and the industry’s market-to-book ratio. Companies appear to go
public not to ﬁnance future investments and growth, but to rebalance their accounts
after high investment and growth.“6
3 The model
Manyempiricalspeciﬁcationsdevelopedinordertoanalyzetheroleofexternal
ﬁnance are not based on theoretical models. It is thus not always entirely clear
what the correct speciﬁcation of the variables of interest should be. For example,
external ﬁnance is often studied as a ratio with respect to the marketvalue of equity,
but it can also be normalized using the book value of capital. Furthermore, some
works employ the Tobin’s q to control for the productivity of investment, while
others use the marginal product of capital, or both. We thus choose to develop a
4Blanchard et al. (1993), p. 132.
5Welch (2004) p. 106.
6Pagano et al. (1998) p. 27.
5very simple investment model which accounts for the role of external ﬁnance.
Our fundamental assumption, following Froot and Stein (1998), is that the re-
course to external ﬁnance is costly, and that such cost is convex. In conditions
of limited and asymmetric information the cost of debt becomes convex because
bankruptcy risks rise with the amount of outstanding debt, as shown by Kashyap
and Stein (1995) and Stein (1998). The issuance of shares may imply convex costs
because outside investors assume that managers issue shares opportunistically, as
implied by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Krasker (1986). Supporting these the-
ories there is a substantial empirical evidence that the demand curve for newly
issued shares is downward sloping, and that large issues must imply a heavy dis-
count, as shown by Masulis and Korwar (1986) and Asquith and Mullins (1986). 7
We assume that investment can be ﬁnanced either internally, using current or past
cash-ﬂows, or externally, issuing shares or debt. Moreover, we assume that only
current period cash-ﬂows can be used to ﬁnance investment.8 Thus, over time, the
manager must satisfy the following constraint:
PI
t It = EFt +CFt, (1)
where CFt = PY
t F(Kt;Nt)¡wtNt are current cash-ﬂows, It is real investment, Kt is
the stock of capital, Nt and wt are, respectively, the quantity and price of variable
inputs, PY
t the price of the output and PI
t the price of investment goods, EFt is
the ﬂow of external ﬁnance, and F(Kt;Nt) is a standard production function. The
expression above can be written in real terms as:
It = Et +RtF(Kt;Nt)¡WtNt, (2)
where Et = EFt
PI




t , and Wt = wt
PI
t . For any other aspect, the model presents
features in line with the standard literature. We assume constant returns to scale
to capital and labor input in the production function, so that the conditions for
the equality of the marginal and average Tobin’s q hold.9 The Lagrangian of the

























7Additional evidence can be found in different papers and for countries other than the US, as
discussed in Gilchrist et al. (2005).
8We are thus assuming that in the accounting of industrial ﬁrms capital adjustment costs affect
depreciation rather than current period cash ﬂows.
9As it was shown by Hayashi (1982).
6where y(It;Kt) and f(Et;Kt) are adjustment cost functions that we specify later on.
The only peculiarity of the proﬁt function is the presence of an adjustment cost for
external ﬁnance.


















Rearranging (5), we obtain:
µt+j = ¡PY
t+jf0(Et+j). (6)
Thus the Lagrange multiplier µt+j must be equal to the marginal cost of external
ﬁnance, or the marginal beneﬁts of cash payouts. Replacing this expression in the




t+jf0(Et+j) = lt+j. (7)
This result shows that the value of the capital (the shadow value of investment)
equals the marginal adjustment cost plus the marginal cost of external ﬁnance.11
A fundamental result by Hayashi (1982) shows that the marginal and average
Tobin’s q are equal when returns to scale are constant. When this is the case, the
parameter l, measuring the marginal increase in value of the stock of capital, be-
comes equal to the Tobin’s q:
St+j+Bt+j
Kt+j , where St+j and Bt+j measure, respectively,
the value of equity and debt of the ﬁrm. Specifying the adjustment cost functions
y(It;Kt) and f(Et;Kt), it becomes possible to express Eq. (7) in terms of observ-
able variables. In order to obtain the equality of the marginal and average Tobin’s
10Since the FOC for capital is not employed in our calculations, we do not report it.
11In a standard investment model the inclusion of external ﬁnance would be incorrect. In such a
framework, in fact, external ﬁnance costs are introduced adding a further constraint, with a new con-
trol variable. In the ﬁrst order conditions the control variable disappears, because it enters linearly in
the constraint. Thus the new Lagrange multiplier imposes a restriction on the value of the discount
factor b, that can be further explained specifying the market imperfections. In this framework the re-
sult is different because external ﬁnance enters the problem non-linearly. As long as our assumption
that external ﬁnance costs (or beneﬁts from cash outﬂows) are non linear holds, the solution of Equa-
tion (7) includes external ﬁnance explicitly, regardless the function speciﬁed. It must be observed,
though, that this does not imply a unique causal relationship: external ﬁnance may act as a constraint
for investment, or cash outﬂows may result from investment. The estimation technique must take
into account this problem of endogeneity.
7q, both these functions must be linearly homogeneous, respectively in investment
and capital, and in external ﬁnance and capital.12 As a consequence, when these
conditions hold, the ﬁrst derivatives of both functions are linear in the ratios It
Kt and
Et











t+jk = lt+j, (8)
where k is a constant. From Eq. (8) we obtain the expression for the measure of



















This is the standard expression showing the marginal return, as measured by Q, of
the investment of a dollar in additional capital of the ﬁrm. We only obtain an extra
term in external ﬁnance, depending on the sign of the variable
Et+j
Kt+j. When the sign
is positive, the return of the investment ﬂow
It+j
Kt+j is measured by Q minus the cost
of ﬁnance. When the sign is negative, then the return of the investment for liability
holders includes both a capital gain measured by Q, and a cash outﬂow, that can be
in the form of either dividend, share repurchase or debt repayment.
Thismodelsuggeststhespeciﬁcationofexternalﬁnanceintermsofaratiowith
respect to a measure of the book value of capital, in order to have a functional form
coherent with the neoclassical model, as discussed by Hayashi (1982). Moreover,





, as in Eq. (9).13 In the absence of such a transformation, the model is, in
fact, misspeciﬁed, because it lacks a variable. Using our dataset, the omission of
this variable changes the results quite substantially, increasing the signiﬁcance of
the remaining variables. Analogously, measuring ﬁnancial ﬂows, such as equity
issuance, as a ratio with respect to market capitalization has a noteworthy impact,
because of the noise introduced in the variable by stock prices.
Themodelcaneasilybespecialized, differentiatingbetweenequityanddebt, to
take into account different slopes of the cost functions. The story remains the same,
the ﬁrm in this case equates at the margin beneﬁts or costs of different liabilities.
12A widely used speciﬁcation of such a function is y(It;Kt) = a
2( It
Kt ¡v)It , as in Hubbard et al.




13As shown, for example, in Schaller (1990).
84 Dataset
Weemployadatabasewhichconsistsofquarterlyaggregatedatafrom1953:Q2
to 2004:Q4 for the US economy. The data are taken from the Flow of Funds Ac-
counts maintained by the Federal Reserve Board, and they regard all non-farm,
non-ﬁnancial corporations. The only exceptions are the deﬂator used to actualize
all the data, the net value added used to calculate the marginal productivity of cap-
ital, and the value of nominal GDP that are taken from the NIPA dataset of the
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
We study ﬁnancial ﬂows measuring their relevance in relation to the value of
the capital stock, as suggested by our model. Furthermore, following Hall (2001),
we have considered the value of both equity and debt in deﬁning the Tobin’s q. We
have not followed Hall (2001) in calculating the market value of debt liabilities so
that, in our measure of the Tobin’s q, equity is calculated at market valued while
debt is calculated at book value. However, since we are not interested in market
values per se, this does not represent a problem. Furthermore, we show in an
Addendum available from the authors that using Hall’s (2001) data with debt at
market value the results do not change signiﬁcantly.
We obtain a measure for real capital, following Hall’s (2001) procedure, by
capitalizing forward the value of aggregate investment minus depreciation.14 We
calculate the marginal productivity of capital using the net value added before in-
vestment spending, which provides an exact measure for the marginal productivity
of capital (MPK). The variable INFLOWS measures the sum of all ﬁnancial ﬂows,
given by the change in net liabilities outstanding, minus dividends, plus equity is-
suance. All variables are deﬂated using the deﬂator for ﬁxed investment. Since the
same deﬂator was used to proxy the price for investment, PI
t does not appear as
independent variable in our estimations.
5 Estimation Methodology
WehavechosentoemploystandardVectorAuto-Regression(VAR)techniques,
in order to avoid problems due to the possible endogeneity among the variables. In
line with Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2004), who have shown that for VAR models that
include three or more variables the AIC becomes, by far, the best performing lag
length criterion, we employ this criterion to determine the lag length of our VAR.
Moreover, the lag length selected by the Likelihood Ratio turns out to be, in most
14Assuming an annual depreciation rate of 10 per cent, corresponding to a quarterly rate of 2.5996
per cent. The initial value (that is virtually irrelevant) is taken from Robert E. Hall’s dataset. See
Hall’s web page at http://www.stanford.edu/ rehall/.
9cases, in line with the AIC. In all the models we estimate, autocorrelation functions
as well as Lagrange Multiplier tests highlight weak presence of serial correlation
in the residuals, suggesting that overall the models are reasonably well speciﬁed.
Throughout the paper all the impulse response functions are generated using the
Generalized Impulses Procedure, as described in Pesaran and Shin (1997). Dif-
ferent procedures for the impulse responses, however, produce outcomes that are
virtually identical.
A further advantage of the VAR technique is that it can produce valid estimates
even thought some of the variables included in the system are non-stationary, as
long as the system as a whole remains stable.15 This is a relevant feature for our
analysis, as some of the variables considered are stationary (such as investment
or the different variables measuring ﬁnancial ﬂows), while others (Q and MPK),
are not. Having both stationary and non-stationary variables, we thus estimate the
VAR models without ﬁrst-differencing the non-stationary variables. The inclusion
in our models of these variable in levels does not affect the overall stability of
the system and the reliability of our estimations. In fact, testing for the stability
of system, we ﬁnd that the eigenvalues are well inside the unit circle. Besides,
analysis of the residuals originated by the estimated VAR models shows that they
are stationary. This, in turn, conﬁrms further on that the systems under analysis
are indeed stable. However, when we proceed to the interpretation of the impulse-
response functions and the Granger causality tests, the issue of non-stationarity in
some variables must be taken into account, insofar some standard inferential results
cannot be applied. Conventional Granger causality tests are, in fact, no longer valid
when an I(1) variable is used as a regressor. In this situation though, Lutkepohl and
Kratzig (2004) show that the test can be performed by estimating a VAR with an
extra lag, and conducting the Wald test ignoring the last redundant lag.16 The only
problem with this procedure is that, because of the redundant parameters, it is not
fully efﬁcient. Nevertheless, given the length of our database, we have a large
number of degrees of freedom, so that the lack of power of the tests should not
be a problem. A further great advantage of the dataset we use, is that it should be
subject to very small measurement errors, since the ﬂow of funds data cover the
whole population of US ﬁrms. This is particularly relevant in Granger causality
15More speciﬁcally, Sims et al. (1990) have shown that in VAR models which contain both station-
ary and non stationary series, the coefﬁcients of non integrated regressors will have normal asymp-
totic distributions while those of integrated regressors will have non normal asymptotic distribu-
tion, and Granger causality tests with non standard limiting distributions (See also Hamilton (1994),
L¨ utkepohl (1993) and Canova (2007)). The stability of the VAR, in turn, is evaluated computing the
associated eigenvalues and checking that they fall within the unit circle.
16See also Dolado and Lutkepohl (1996).
10analysis, since errors in variables generate spurious causality.17
We introduce two dummy variables for the quarters 1979:Q3 and 1980:Q1. In
the ﬁrst quarter the change in regime due to the adoption of the new operating pro-
cedures by the FED under Paul Volker produced a violent reduction of commercial
paper issuance that was entirely reversed two quarters afterwards. The impact of
these shocks is evident in all variables that include changes in the stock of debt.
Moreover we introduce a seasonal dummy for the third quarter of the year that
turns out to be always signiﬁcant for all the variables, including issuance. We test
for the introduction of a deterministic time trend, and it turns out to be signiﬁcant
in the equations where issuance is the dependent variable. Given that the inclusion
of a term trend in such a VAR is quite controversial, we choose not to include it,
following Sims’ approach; nevertheless its inclusion would not alter the results.
Finally, we control our model augmenting the VAR systems with growth in real
GDP and oil prices, and ﬁve and ten-years term spreads. None of these variables,
however, has a signiﬁcant impact on our results.
6 External ﬁnance and investment
6.1 Aggregate ﬂows
In this ﬁrst subsection we investigate the relevance of external ﬁnance for in-
vestment. The analysis is carried out by means of a simple VAR model including
the variables INV, INFLOWS, and Q (shown in Fig. 1). The variable INFLOWS
measures all net ﬂows of external ﬁnance, including capital raised in the stock
market, and the increase in debt liabilities, minus dividends paid and shares re-
purchased.18 Granger causality tests for the above-mentioned model are reported
in Table 1. These tests show that INFLOWS do not Granger-cause neither invest-
ment, nor Q, at standard signiﬁcance levels. This suggests that ﬁnancial constraints
do not limit aggregate investment. Moreover, INFLOWS are not Granger-caused
neither by INV, nor Q, as one would expect if external ﬁnance is raised in order to
ﬁnance investment. Fig. 2 shows the impulse response function of INFLOWS to
a one standard deviation shock on Q and INV, and that of INV to a one standard
deviation shock on INFLOWS. The impact of inﬂows on investment is irrelevant,
since the impulse response is never statistically different from zero. Moreover, as
shown in Fig. 3, INFLOWS is never signiﬁcant in explaining the forecasting error
variance of investment at standard signiﬁcance levels, for any time horizon. IN-
FLOWS, in fact, accounts for only 0:72% and 4:89% of the forecast error variance
17See Sargent (1987).
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Figure 1: Time series plot of the variables Q, INV, and INFLOWS for the period
1953:Q2-2004:Q4.
of investment after, respectively, 10 and 40 quarters (10 years).19 Considering that
our measure of inﬂows includes all transfers of cash between corporate ﬁrms and
capital stock owners, this result suggests that the availability of external ﬁnance
has a limited impact on aggregate investment. Financial constraints do not seem
to play a relevant role for investment of non ﬁnancial corporate ﬁrms. According
to the impulse response functions of Fig. 2, shocks on investment and Q generate
19The variables INV, INFLOWS, and Q are in this order for the Cholesky decomposition that we
use for the variance decomposition only.The AIC suggests the use of a VAR with four lags. In this
formulation our prior is that inﬂows (or outﬂows) are an outcome of real investment decisions. How-
ever, it is very important to observe that our results do not depend on the chosen ordering of the VAR.
Other alternative orderings produce results that are extremely similar to those set out. This normally
occurs when the variables are poorly correlated. In our case INV is positively correlated with both Q
and INFLOWS, but the coefﬁcients, even though statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve per cent level, are
small (0.486637 and 0.311923, respectively), and the correlation between Q and INFLOWS is very
close to zero (-0.033676) and statistically not signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent conﬁdence level. The
impact of INFLOWS innovation on the system is therefore limited. Moreover, both Q and INV have
a high autocorrelation coefﬁcient, while this is not the case for INFLOWS. This implies that shocks
to the ﬁrst two variables are extremely persistent. As a consequence, even the ordering between the
ﬁrst two variables is not important because the direction of the contemporaneous effect is scarcely
relevant.
12Table 1: Causality tests among Q, INV and INFLOWS.
Null hypothesis: gij(L) = 0 for i 6= j
Q INV INFLOWS
Q ¡ 0:000 0:279
INV 0:046 ¡ 0:117
INFLOWS 0:221 0:307 ¡
Test for null hypothesis that x1;t does not Granger-cause x2;t. The ”dependent”
variables x2;t are reported in the columns while the variables x1;t appear in the
rows of the table. We indicate with gij(L) = 0 for i 6= j the null hypothesis that
the coefﬁcients of the lagged ”dependent” variables are equal to zero. The test
is a Wald test, we report the P-values, computed using the k2 distribution with
4 degrees of freedom. When the ”dependent” variable is I(1), the Wald test is
conducted on a regression including one extra lag.
a positive response of INFLOWS that is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve per cent
conﬁdence level. Nevertheless, obtaining conﬁdence intervals by means of Mon-
tecarlo simulations, it can be shown that the proportion of the variability of IN-
FLOWS explained by Q and INV, (8:18% and 7:99% respectively after 10 periods
and 9:54% and 8:48% respectively after 40 periods) is not statistically signiﬁcant
at standard conﬁdence levels. This suggest that even if investment and Q have an
impact on ﬁnancial ﬂows to and from the ﬁrm, their relevance is rather limited.
In line with the Neoclassical Theory, the Granger causality test shows that the re-
lationship of causality between INV and expected value of future productivity of
capital (as measured by Q) is bi-directional and statistically signiﬁcant at standard
signiﬁcance levels. Impulse-response functions show that innovations in Q have a
strong positive impact on investment.20 As expected, shocks on Q explain a large
share (47:27% after 10 quarters and 51:74% after 40 quarters) of the forecasting
error variance of INV.
We now sophisticate the baseline VAR previously employed by decompos-
ing INFLOWS into changes in the value of the stock of debt net of interest ﬂows
(DDEBT), and net equity issuance (ISSUES), measuring the sums raised by means
of primary placements of shares minus the amount spent to repurchase shares.21
20To save space we do not report the related diagrams.
21The AIC indicates that three is the optimal number of lags in this case. We include a dummy for
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Response of INV to Generalized One
S.D. INFLOWS Innovation
Figure 2: Impulse response functions of INFLOWS to a one-standard deviation
shock on Q and INV, and of INV to a one-standard deviation shock on INFLOWS.
Horizontal axis shows 10-years response horizon. The responses are generated by
using the generalized impulse response procedure, conﬁdence intervals shown are
at the 95% level.
The two variables are depicted in Figure 4. It is quite evident that there is a nega-
tive correlation between the two series (the correlation is -0.28 in our sample), so
that, on aggregate ﬁrms in the US increase debt issuance to repurchase shares or
issue new shares to reduce debt. Granger causality tests for the VAR including Q,
INV, DDEBT and ISSUES are reported in Table 2. We obtain some evidence that
share issuance has a weak, positive impact on investment, in fact, the null that IS-
SUES do not Granger-cause INV is reject, although only at 10% signiﬁcance level.
Moreover, the impulse response function of Fig. 5 conﬁrms that shocks on share
issuance have a positive impact on investment (although only marginally signiﬁ-
cant at 5% level). The variance decomposition, though, highlights that shocks on
ISSUES explain a negligible (and, as before, not statistically signiﬁcant) portion of
the forecasting error variance of INV (1.68% after 10 quarters, and 2.23% after 40
quarters). On the contrary, there is no evidence that investment decisions affect net
share issuance. The other new insight obtained by discriminating between equity
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Variance Decomposition of INFLOWS
Figure 3: Forecast error variance decomposition of Q, INV and INFLOWS at hori-
zons up to ten years. The source of this forecast error is the variation in the current
and future values of the innovations to each endogenous variable in the VAR. Ver-
tical axis shows the percentage of the forecast variance due to each innovation, the
sum adding up to 100. Cholesky ordering: Q, INV, INFLOWS.
and debt ﬁnance is that net share issues positively respond to shocks on Q and neg-
atively to shocks affecting DDEBT. The variance decomposition of Fig. 6 shows
that Q and DDEBT explain, respectively, 7.22% and 11.46% of the forecasting er-
ror variance of ISSUES after 10 quarters and 18.31% and 12.31% after 40. Even in
this case though, these values are not statistically signiﬁcant. While the linkage be-
tween Q and ISSUES is weak (in fact, both the impulse response function and the
Granger causality test are not statistically signiﬁcant), the linkage between DDEBT
and ISSUES is neater (being, in this case, both the impulse response function and
the Granger causality test statistically signiﬁcant). Net issuance of shares grows
when stock market prices are high, and it declines when ﬁrms issue new debt, as it
would be the case if they issue debt in order to repurchase shares. On the contrary,
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Figure 4: Time series plot of the variables ISSUES (net issues of stocks) and
DDEBT (changes in the levels of debt) for the period 1953:Q2-2004:Q4.
6.2 Gross equity issues
We now proceed to the estimation of a further VAR model which makes use
of a newly constructed database. The speciﬁc feature of this new database is that
issues are now gross, and include proceeds from IPOs, capital increases, private
placements and convertible bonds.22 The crucial difference between this new one
and the database previously employed is thus that share repurchases are not taken
into account. Moreover, the new data were available only for the period 1970:Q1-
2004:Q4, so they cover a shorter lapse of time than the previous. The main purpose
of this exercise is to test whether investment responds to gross issues, since, after
all, gross values of primary placements (GROSSISSUES) should be relevant if
equity is used as a source of ﬁnance. Fig. 7 shows, in fact, that the relationship
between gross issues and changes in the stock of debt is completely different from
that between net issues and DDEBT. While the correlation between DDEBT and
net issues is negative, GROSSISSUES and DDEBT turn out to be complement (the
correlation between the two series in our sample is, in fact, 0.21.) We thus estimate
a VAR model similar to the previous one where, however, net share issuance is
replaced by gross issues.23 Granger causality tests are reported in Table 3. While
shocks on net issues seemed to produce a weak impact on aggregate investment,
22The data are taken from the Statistical Supplement to the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
23The lag length suggested by the AIC and LR criterion for the VAR employed in this section is
equal to 4.
16Table 2: Causality tests among Q, INV, DDEBT and ISSUES
Null hypothesis: gij(L) = 0 for i 6= j
Q INV DDEBT ISSUES
Q ¡ 0:000 0:0500 0:154
INV 0:240 ¡ 0:701 0:164
DDEBT 0:851 0:704 ¡ 0:060
ISSUES 0:583 0:099 0:336 ¡
Test for null hypothesis that x1;t does not Granger-cause x2;t. The ”dependent” variables
x2;t are reported in the columns while the variables x1;t appear in the rows of the table. We
indicate with gij(L) = 0 for i 6= j the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcients of the lagged
”dependent” variables are equal to zero. The test is a Wald test, we report -values,
computed using the k2 distribution with 4 degrees of freedom. When the ”dependent”
variable is I(1), the Wald test is conducted on a regression including one extra lag.
this VAR suggests that primary placements of shares do not inﬂuence investment.
The Granger causality tests of Table 3, the variance decomposition of Fig. 10, and
the impulse response function of Fig. 8 show, in fact, that both gross equity is-
suance and changes in the stock of debt have no signiﬁcant impact on aggregate
investment. These new results shed some light on the driving forces behind pri-
mary placements. Q innovations explain a large (i.e. 60.68 % after 10 periods
and 65.21 % after 40 periods) share of the forecasting error variance of GROSSIS-
SUES. Moreover, Q Granger-causes GROSSISSUES at standard signiﬁcance lev-
els. This conﬁrms previous ﬁndings, as those of Welch (2004), that share issuance
is strongly dependent on equity valuations. The new evidence that this exercise
provides is that investment also affects equity issuance. The null that INV does
not Granger-cause GROSSISSUES is, in fact, soundly rejected. More surprising
results emerge from the impulse response functions shown in Fig. 9. Positive Q
shocks have a strong positive impact on issuance, while positive investment shocks
have a signiﬁcant negative impact. Not only primary placements of shares are not
used to ﬁnance investment, but the impulse response functions suggest that invest-
ment reduce the issuance of shares, at least at the very short horizon, i.e. between
the second and sixth quarter. These results imply that, in ﬁrst order, insiders issue
shares when they judge that the market fully prices expected earnings, or, even
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Response of ISSUES to Generalized One
S.D. DDEBT Innovation
Figure 5: Impulse response of INV to a one-standard deviation shock on ISSUES,
and of ISSUES to a one-standard deviation shock on INV, Q and DDEBT. Hori-
zontal axis shows 10-years response horizon. The responses are generated by using
the generalized impulse response procedure, conﬁdence intervals shown are at the
95% level.
explored by P´ astor and Veronesi (2005), that IPOs are concentrated in waves. This
happens because entrepreneurs choose the optimal timing for the IPOs, waiting
for favorable market conditions such as low expected returns or high aggregate
proﬁtability, both implying high levels of Q. Supporting empirical evidence comes
from Daniel and Titman (2006): they highlight that ﬁrms issuing shares substan-
tially underperform the market during the following two years period. Lyandres
et al. (2007) ﬁnd strong evidence suggesting that the underperformance of issuers
is due to the fact that issuers invest more than non-issuers. They thus interpret their
results as supporting the implication of the neoclassical theory that investment re-
duces ﬁrm-level expected returns, because of decreasing marginal productivity, as
shown by Cochrane (1991). In this light we interpret our second, more surprising
result as suggesting that since the market anticipates that those ﬁrms that need to
ﬁnance large investment will underperform, the quantity of cash that these ﬁrms
raise in the market is lower the higher their investment needs. In other words, it
























Variance Decomposition of ISSUES
Figure 6: Forecast error variance decomposition of INV and ISSUES at horizons
up to ten years. The source of this forecast error is the variation in the current and
future values of the innovations to each endogenous variable in the VAR. Vertical
axis shows the percentage of the forecast variance due to each innovation, the sum
adding up to 100. Cholesky ordering: Q, INV, DDEBT, ISSUES.
and whose shares are accordingly priced at high price-earnings multiples. What we
should expect is that, in general, ﬁrms are sold on the market at the end of the in-
vestment cycle, to reap the beneﬁts of past successful investment. This is what our
results highlight, and they follow closely those obtained by Pagano et al. (1998)
studying the market for IPOs in Italy. Table 3 also shows that DDEBT is now
Granger-caused by both Q and GROSSISSUES, while a bi-directional causality
arises between Q and GROSSISSUES. Moreover, the impulse response functions
of Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 highlight that shocks on share issuance have a signiﬁcant pos-
itive impact on both DDEBT and Q. These results suggest that GROSSISSUES
and DDEBT are complements, and they both positively respond to shocks on Q.
Moreover, the impulse response function of Fig. 9 and the variance decomposition
of Fig. 10 highlight that Q shocks have strong positive impact on net debt issuance,
explaining a large (14.2 % after 10 periods and 16.56 after 40 periods) and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant share of its forecasting error variance. More surprisingly, even Q
responds to GROSSISSUES shocks, even if this last variable explains a relatively
modest share of the its variance. Our hypothesis is that both variables react to the
same underlying driving force, the proﬁtability of ﬁrms. In this case GROSSIS-
SUES must rise when the stock market has an upward trend, as insiders try to
anticipate the peak in stock market valuations, in line with the prediction of P´ astor
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Figure 7: Time series plot of the variables GROSSISSUES (gross issuance of
stocks) and DDEBT (changes in the levels of debt) for the period 1970:Q1-
2004:Q4.
6.3 Is the market a sideshow?
In order to evaluate to what extent current or future proﬁtability drive invest-
ment and ﬁnancial ﬂows, in this section we replicate part of the analysis of the
previous section, but making use of a different model of investment. We now
substitute the value of MPK for that of Q in the reduced form that we estimate.
This reduced form is easily obtained under a static investment model, assuming
the presence of linearly additive convex (quadratic) costs on investment and ex-
ternal ﬁnance. Since we are studying aggregate investment, the convex costs can
be considered as the consequence of the scarcity of the factors of production. In
order to increase aggregate investment, resources previously devoted to other uses
must be hired: this, in turn, results in higher input prices. The aim of this section
is to isolate the role of current marginal productivity of capital (MPK) from that
of future values of MPK, as they are captured in the measure of Q by the market
value of ﬁrm liabilities. By studying the role of current MPK we can thus under-
stand whether the impact of Q on investment and/or external ﬁnance is not driven
by stock market valuations. To see why this is the case, we need a few lines of al-
gebra. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale to capital and labor input
in the production function,24 marginal productivity of capital is equal to the ratio
between the value added before investment spending and capital. In fact, by using
24So that the conditions for the equality of marginal and average Q hold.
20Table 3: Causality tests among Q, INV, DDEBT and GROSSISSUES
Null hypothesis: gij(L) = 0 for i 6= j
Q INV DDEBT GROSSISSUES
Q ¡ 0:088 0:011 0:000
INV 0:021 ¡ 0:917 0:010
DDEBT 0:584 0:973 ¡ 0:897
GROSSISSUES 0:087 0:842 0:003 ¡
Test for null hypothesis that x1;t does not Granger-cause x2;t. The ”dependent” variables
x2;t are reported in the columns while the variables x1;t appear in the rows of the table. We
indicate with gij(L) = 0 for i 6= j the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcients of the lagged
”dependent” variables are equal to zero. The test is a Wald test, we report -values,
computed using the k2 distribution with 4 degrees of freedom. When the ”dependent”
variable is I(1), the Wald test is conducted on a regression including one extra lag.
a standard Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation for the production function, and computing
the ﬁrst derivatives with respect to K and N, we get:

















Setting the second condition to zero and substituting it into the ﬁrst, one obtains:







The equation deﬁning the marginal product of capital can then be solved for the
value of capital. Recalling the value of Q and substituting the value of K from the












This formulation illustrates that part of the variability of Q is caused by changes in
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Response of Q to Generalized One
S.D. GROSSISSUES Innovation
Figure 8: Impulse response of INV to a one-standard deviation shock on
GROSSISSUES and DDEBT, and of Q to a one-standard deviation shock on
GROSSISSUES. The responses are generated by using the generalized impulse
response procedure, conﬁdence intervals shown are at the 95% level.
picts the stochastic properties of two time series, shows that, except for the ﬁrst ﬁve
years, the two series clearly co-move. We thus initially replicate the VAR analysis
of section 6.1, replacing Q with MPK, in order to isolate the impact of MPK from
that of other components, stock prices in particular.25 The Granger causality tests
(not reported) produce results very similar to those of the baseline VAR, which
includes Q in place of MPK, the only difference being that there are even stronger
rejections of the null hypotheses that MPK does not Granger-cause INV and vice
versa. As the standard Neoclassical Theory suggests, bidirectional causality be-
tween the two variables occurs. Fig. 12 shows that investment shocks initially have
a positive impact on MPK, while the response becomes negative and signiﬁcant
from the ﬁfth quarter onward. MPK shocks have a strong and highly signiﬁcant
positive impact on investment that dies out only after more than 15 quarters. The
variance decomposition of Fig. 13 shows that MPK explains a larger portion of
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Response of DDEBTD to Generalized One
S.D. Q Innovation
Figure 9: Impulse response of GROSSISSUES to a one-standard deviation shock
on INV and Q anf of DDEBT to a one standard deviation shock on GROSSISSUES
and Q. Horizontal axis shows 10-years response horizon; The responses are gen-
erated by using the generalized impulse response procedure, conﬁdence intervals
shown are at the 95% level.
the forecasting error variance of INV than Q. Likewise, INV explains a larger por-
tion of the forecasting error variance of MPK than Q, conﬁrming that MPK has
a stronger positive impact on investment than Q, and the impact of investment on
MPK is much stronger than that on Q.26 More speciﬁcally, MPK innovations ex-
plain 72.46 % of the forecasting error variance of INV after 10 periods and 70.44
% after 40 periods, while INV innovations explain 32.24 % after 10 periods and
46.72% after 40 periods, of the forecasting error variance of MPK.27
Once again, the forecasting variance of INFLOWS is not explained neither by
26Also in this case, however, the inclusion in our VAR model of an I(1) variable does not impair
the stability of the model itself. The eigenvalues of the system fall within the unit circle and the
residuals turn out to be stationary. This time we have chosen to have MPK ﬁrst in the Choleski
decomposition, but even in this case the ordering chosen does not affect the results substantially.
27While Q accounts for 49.14 % after 10 periods and 51.74 % after 40 periods of the forecasting





















































Variance Decomposition of DDEBT
Figure 10: Forecast error variance decomposition of Q, INV, GROSSISSUES and
DDEBTathorizonsuptotenyears. Thesourceofthisforecasterroristhevariation
in the current and future values of the innovations to each endogenous variable
in the VAR. Vertical axis shows the percentage of the forecast variance due to
each innovation, the sum adding up to 100. Cholesky ordering: Q, INV, DDEBT,
GROSSISSUES.
investment nor by the marginal productivity of capital.28 Moreover, consistently
with the previous results, investment and INFLOWS turn out to be totally unre-
lated. These results suggest that the correlation between Q and investment is, to a
large extent, driven by the variability of current values of the marginal productivity
of capital, rather than by its expected future values captured by stock markets.
Finally we estimate a VAR model which includes MPK, INV, DDEBT and
GROSSISSUES. Comparing the new Granger causality tests of Table 4 with those
of Table 3 we can observe that the null that MPK does not Granger-cause INV
is now soundly rejected, since the p-value is equal to 0.001. This supports the
view that the impact of Q on investment is largely driven by MPK, rather than by
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Response of MPK to Generalized One
S.D. INV Innovation
Figure 12: Impulse response functions of investment to MPK innovations and MPK
to investment innovations. Horizontal axis shows 10-years response horizon. The
responses are generated by using the generalized impulse response procedure, con-
ﬁdence intervals shown are at the 95% level.
stock prices. The second striking difference between the two V AR models regards
GROSSISSUES: while the null that Q does not Granger-cause GROSSISSUES is
rejected at standard signiﬁcance levels, the null that MPK does not Granger-cause
GROSSISSUES is never rejected. Moreover, the impulse response function of
Fig. 14 conﬁrms that the impact of MPK shocks on GROSSISSUES is never signif-
icant at conventional signiﬁcance levels. This suggests that gross equity issuance is
driven by stock market valuations, rather than by the current marginal productivity
of capital. On the contrary, changes in the stock of debt are affected by the current
period MPK. Fig. 14, in fact, shows that MPK shocks have a signiﬁcant positive
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Variance Decomposition of MPK
Figure 13: Forecast error variance decomposition of INV and MPK at horizons up
to ten years. The source of this forecast error is the variation in the current and
future values of the innovations to each endogenous variable in the VAR. Vertical
axis shows the percentage of the forecast variance due to each innovation, the sum
adding up to 100. Cholesky ordering: MPK, INV, INFLOWS.
Table 4: Causality tests among MPK, INV, DDEBT and GROSSISSUES
Null hypothesis: gij(L) = 0 for i 6= j
MPK INV DDEBT GROSSISSUES
MPK ¡ 0:001 0:032 0:782
INV 0:002 ¡ 0:238 0:0513
DDEBT 0:218 0:570 ¡ 0:543
GROSSISSUES 0:020 0:549 0:497 ¡
Test for null hypothesis that x1;t does not Granger-cause x2;t. The ”dependent” variables
x2;t are reported in the columns while the variables x1;t appear in the rows of the table. We
indicate with gij(L) = 0 for i 6= j the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcients of the lagged
”dependent” variables are equal to zero. The test is a Wald test, we report -values,
computed using the k2 distribution with 4 degrees of freedom. When the ”dependent”
variable is I(1), the Wald test is conducted on a regression including one extra lag.
is rejected at the 5 % level, as it was the case for Q. In the next section, though,
we show that controlling for both Q and MPK, the impact of MPK on DDEBT
becomes insigniﬁcant. Overall these results conﬁrm that stock market valuations
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Response of DDEBT to Generalized One
S.D. MPK Innovation
Figure 14: Impulse response functions of GROSSISSUES and DDEBT to MPK
innovations. Horizontal axis shows 10-years response horizon. The responses are
generated by using the generalized impulse response procedure, conﬁdence inter-
vals shown are at the 95% level.
6.4 Macroeconomic Determinants of External Finance
Table 5: Causality tests among Q, MPK, DDEBT and GROSSISSUES
Null hypothesis: gij(L) = 0 for i 6= j
Q MPK DDEBT GROSSISSUES
Q ¡ 0:004 0:015 0:000
MPK 0:819 ¡ 0:328 0:054
DDEBT 0:291 0:148 ¡ 0:951
GROSSISSUES 0:053 0:587 0:110 ¡
Test for null hypothesis that x1;t does not Granger-cause x2;t. The ”dependent” variables
x2;t are reported in the columns while the variables x1;t appear in the rows of the table. We
indicate with gij(L) = 0 for i 6= j the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcients of the lagged
”dependent” variables are equal to zero. The test is a Wald test, we report -values,
computed using the k2 distribution with 4 degrees of freedom. When the ”dependent”
variable is I(1), the Wald test is conducted on a regression including one extra lag.
We now want to further inspect whether the actual driving force of external
ﬁnance is the marginal productivity of capital or rather stock market valuations, or
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Response of GROSSISSUES to Generalized
One S.D. MPK Innovation
Figure 15: Impulse response functions of DDEBT and GROSSISSUES to a one-
standard deviation shock on Q and MPK. Horizontal axis shows 10-years response
horizon. The responses are generated by using the generalized impulse response
procedure, conﬁdence intervals shown are at the 95% level.
DDEBTD and GROSSISSUES.29 By including both Q and MPK in the analysis,
we hope to capture the impact of stock market valuations, after controlling for
the effect of MPK. The analysis is carried out by making use of the dataset for
gross values of primary placements already employed in Section 6.2. The Granger
causality tests reported in Table 5 show that the null hypotheses that Q does not
Granger-cause MPK and external ﬁnance are soundly rejected at standard signiﬁ-
cance levels. On the other hand, MPK does not appear to Granger-cause neither Q
not DDEBT, while it appears to Granger-cause GROSSISSUES, but only at 10%
signiﬁcance level. Moreover, as already highlighted by previous analysis, the null
that GROSSISSUES do not Granger-cause Q must be rejected, although only at
10% signiﬁcance level.
The variance decomposition set out in Fig. 16 shows that, as expected, Q ex-
29The lag length suggested by the AIC criterion for the VAR employed in this section is equal to
4. The LR criterion also supports this choice. Also in this case the inclusion of I(1) variables in the
VAR model does not affect the stability of the model. In fact, all the eigenvalues of the system fall
within the unit circle. Notice that the ordering adopted for the Cholesky decomposition is Q, MPK,
DDEBTD and GROSSISSUES.
28plains a large share of the forecasting error variance of MPK (respectively 53.38%
and 51.61% after 10 and 40 quarters). Most importantly for our analysis, it also
shows that the sources of external ﬁnance are largely explained by Q, while the im-
portance of MPK is negligible. This result is especially true for GROSSISSUES,
where Q explains 64.62% and 68.40% of the forecasting error variance after, re-
spectively, 10 and 40 quarters. With regard to DDEBT, Q explains 24.68% and
25.19% of the forecasting error variance after 10 and 40 quarters, while the por-
tion explained by MPK is, respectively, 5.6% and 14.56%. Moreover, as expected,
none of the above variables play a signiﬁcant role in explaining the forecasting
error variance of Q. This, in turn, supports the view of the Tobin’s q as a leading
(forward looking) indicator.
Overall, these results highlight that the driving force that affects external ﬁ-
nance is given by stock market valuations, while the role reserved to the marginal
productivity of capital turns out to be largely negligible. Such conclusion is also
supported by the impulse-response functions reported in Fig. 15. In fact, positive
shocks on Q have positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact on both the sources
of external ﬁnance.30 On the contrary, positive shocks on MPK appear to have
negligible impact.31
30This, in turn, supports the argument set out in Section 6.2, where it was shown that the two
sources of external ﬁnance are complement.
31It can also be shown that shocks on Q have positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact on MPK.



















































Variance Decomposition of GROSSISSUES
Figure 16: Forecast error variance decomposition of Q, MPK, DDEBT, and
GROSSISSUES at horizons up to ten years. The source of this forecast error is
the variation in the current and future values of the innovations to each endogenous
variable in the VAR. Vertical axis shows the percentage of the forecast variance
due to each innovation, the sum adding up to 100. Cholesky ordering: Q, MPK,
DDEBT, GROSSISSUES.
7 Conclusions
The basic result of our analysis is that the amount of resources raised issu-
ing shares and debt by industrial corporations in the US has no signiﬁcant impact
on aggregate investment, contrary to what we would expect if the availability of
external ﬁnance represents a relevant constraint. These results are in line with
Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993), Chirinko and Schaller (1996), and Fama
and French (1999). More surprisingly, we also ﬁnd that the amount of ﬁnance
raised by means of primary placements depends only marginally on the needs to
ﬁnance investment. In the case of shares, we even ﬁnd that positive investment
shocks cause a signiﬁcant negative impact on issuance. Moreover, we ﬁnd that
30the issuance of shares is largely driven by stock market valuations, conﬁrming the
ﬁndings of Welch (2004). We thus conjecture, in line with Pagano et al. (1998),
that industrial ﬁrms issue shares in order to reap the beneﬁts of successful past
investment, when market prices match or exceed insiders’ valuations. Moreover,
Lyandres et al. (2007) ﬁnd that the underperformance of shares of the ﬁrms issuing
stock is due to the fact that those ﬁrms invest more. We thus argue that our ﬁnding
that investment shocks reduce the quantity of ﬁnance raised in the stock market is
a rational response of the market to the underperformance of the shares of the ﬁrms
that have to sustain large investments.
We also ﬁnd that share issuance has a signiﬁcant positive impact on our mea-
sure of Tobin’s q. Moreover, debt issuance is positively inﬂuenced by both the
value of the Tobin’s q and share issuance itself; equity issuance and changes in
the level of debt are thus complements. We thus conjecture that the three vari-
ables react to the same underlying driving force, the expected proﬁtability of ﬁrms.
Issuance thus rises when stock prices follow an upward trend, as managers that
beneﬁt from inside information try to anticipate the peak in stock market valua-
tions.
As expected, a neat linkage exists between investment and Tobin’s q, whereas
the causality relationship goes from q to investment. We ﬁnd some prima facie
evidence, though, that the signiﬁcance of the Tobin’s q when regressed on invest-
ment is due to the marginal productivity of capital, rather than to the stock market
valuations. On the contrary, external ﬁnance is driven by market valuations, rather
than by current values of the marginal productivity of capital. Finally, we ﬁnd
evidence that debt levels positively respond to net equity issue shocks, where the
latter is the difference between share issuance and share repurchases. This result
conﬁrms that, in the aggregate, industrial companies in the US issue debt in order
to purchase shares.
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